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RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0061
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1091
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000519

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SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: DISCUSSION OF A STRATEGIC ROLE FOR NATO

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Classified By: A/PolAd Alejandro "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C/NF) Summary. On November 4, the North Atlantic Council discussed progress in implementing the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit decision to build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan. NATO SYG Rasmussen said NATO would enhance the political dialogue, expand military cooperation, and increase public diplomacy efforts to broaden NATO/Pakistan relations. Allies acknowledged that NATO needed to be more proactive in reaching out to Islamabad. Allies also agreed with the U.S. Ambassador's suggestion that NATO complete a Tailored Cooperation Program for Pakistan as a deliverable for the NATO December 3-4 Foreign Ministerial. The NATO SYG said he would invite more leaders from the Pakistani government to speak to the NAC in an effort to increase NATO-Pakistan consultations. Rasmussen was particularly committed to using media outlets as a tool to advance the NATO/Pakistan relationship, stating he would increase NATO op-eds and press releases highlighting NATO's role in Pakistan. In an update on the planning and implementation of the Af/Pak Border Coordination Centers, the Director of the NATO International Military Staff said Pakistan agreed to open two BCCs by the end of 2010 on its side of the border. However, Islamabad still had not specified where they would be located. End Summary.

Building the Relationship

¶2. (C/NF) NATO SYG Rasmussen suggested a three-pronged strategy of enhancing political dialogue, expanding military cooperation, and increasing NATO's public diplomacy efforts to build a stronger NATO-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari's visit to the North Atlantic Council and private meeting with NATO SYG Rasmussen in September was highlighted by the SYG as a positive step towards enhanced political dialogue between NATO and Pakistan. The NATO SYG said he would invite more leaders from the Pakistani government to speak to the NAC in an effort to increase NATO-Pakistan consultations.

¶3. (C/NF) Turkey, the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Islamabad, said NATO needed to be more proactive in reaching

out to Pakistan. Allies agreed and recognized that the NATO-Pakistan relationship would be uneven in the beginning, requiring NATO to take a more forward-leaning approach to strengthening the engagement. Italy and France said that NATO was the "demandeur" in the NATO-Pakistan relationship because NATO needed Pakistan more than Pakistan needed NATO. The Italian PermRep reminded the Council to fulfill its commitments to Pakistan and keep realistic expectations with regard to a "partnership" with Pakistan.

Support for a Tailored Cooperation Program

14. (C/NF) Noting that Pakistan was an important element of the regional approach to Afghanistan, Ambassador Daalder suggested that NATO complete a Tailored Cooperation Program (TCP) for Pakistan as a deliverable for the NATO December 3-4 Foreign Ministerial. At the same time, Daalder said that Foreign Ministers in December should treat NATO's relationship with Pakistan delicately, concentrating on how it could be accomplished through a tailored and practical approach.

15. (C/NF) Canada said NATO needed to use the various tools available to NATO to build trust with the Pakistan government and public. The PermRep also said that strengthening civilian control of the military should be an important aspect of a NATO's engagement with Pakistan. In this regard, he said that the opening of appropriate NATO Partnership Tools are a part of a TCP that might prove useful. The PermRep also highlighted the need for more political level interactions with Pakistan. Other Allies, including Greece,

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also supported a TCP.

Other Ways to Enhance the Military Dialogue

16. (C/NF) Allies said that there was a critical need to improve military cooperation and contact between NATO and Pakistan. SYG Rasmussen suggested inviting more Pakistani military officers to train at NATO's Defense college. Rasmussen said he would work to establish a NATO/ISAF military liaison office in Islamabad and a slot for a Pakistani military officer in SHAPE Headquarters. Turkey endorsed this new post, describing Pakistan as the "Frontline state on the war against terrorism." Germany suggested using the success of the Tri-Partite Commission as a tool to increase NATO's engagement with Pakistan at the most senior levels within the military. The Netherlands agreed and said that Pakistan was critical to NATO's approach to regional stability in South Asia.

Using Media as a Tool

17. (C/NF) The NATO SecGen said he would use NATO public diplomacy tools to increase public awareness in Pakistan of NATO's role in the country. The Turkish PermRep agreed that public diplomacy could help ease the mix of expectations and skepticism about NATO in Pakistan. Turkey suggested Rasmussen place an article in one of the leading Pakistani newspapers to highlight positive aspects of NATO in Pakistan. The NATO SYG agreed and promised to develop more robust NATO public diplomacy efforts, as well as include more Pakistani leaders, journalists, and seminars on the NAC agenda in 2010.

18. (C/NF) The Czech Republic expressed caution in using media tools to highlight NATO's enhanced political dialogue with Pakistan. In the Czech view, NATO needs to consider how public discussion of NATO-Pakistan relations will play in the larger Pakistan-India dynamic. Canada noted that any future NATO humanitarian assistance to Pakistan's Internally Displaced People/Refugees could be leveraged for NATO public

diplomacy efforts.

Pakistan's Border Coordination Center Plans

¶9. (C/NF) The Director of the NATO International Military Staff, LTG Godderij, said Pakistan announced at the September 29 Tri-Partite Commission meeting that it would open two Border Coordination Centers (BCC) on its soil by the end of 2010, although specific locations had not yet been identified. Godderij said that by the end of 2010 there would be a total of four operational BCCs. BCCs at Spin Boldak and Lawara in Afghanistan were expected to open by the end of December 2009.

And on the Afghanistan Side of the Border...

¶10. (C/NF) Godderij also said that ISAF force movements from the border regions of Kunar and Nuristan to the border provinces' capitols should be interpreted as a redeployment of forces to population-centric areas, not a withdrawal. He said that the RC-East force re-distributions were carried out in order to focus on areas with a higher probability for civilian program success after forces had "cleared" insurgent elements out and created a more secure environment.

¶11. (C/NF) Referring to the shooting of several UK soldiers by a member of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Greece highlighted the need for ISAF to properly screen candidates. The PermRep suggested that ISAF conduct a deep analysis of ANSF performance to ensure security and intelligence integrity was maintained on both sides of the Af-Pak border.

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